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The Sixth District of the California Court of Appeal
Throws a Curveball:
The Use of Juvenile Adjudications as Strikes in
California Post-People v. Nguyen
Benjamin Price
INTRODUCTION
Michael Jones, age twenty-six, has been convicted of robbery in an
adult criminal proceeding. Because he suffered a prior juvenile adjudication for the same offense when he was seventeen years old, the Deputy District Attorney alleged that the juvenile adjudication was a strike under California’s   Three   Strikes   Law.      As   a   result,   Michael’s   sentence   was   double  
what it would normally have been for a first-time robbery offense. As he is
sitting in jail, he receives word that his friend is being charged with kidnapping. He remembers that his friend suffered a prior juvenile adjudication for assault when he was sixteen years old. When Michael’s friend
comes to visit him in jail, he laments the fact that his friend will suffer
double the normal penalty due to the assault adjudication being used as a
strike.      “Actually,”   his   friend   tells   him,   “my   lawyer   says   that   the   District  
Attorney can no longer use that juvenile adjudication as a strike against
me.”    Michael  is  very  upset  and  calls  his  attorney. His attorney promises to
research the issue and see if a re-sentencing hearing can be arranged.
This   is   the   scene   across   California.      California’s   Three   Strikes   Law  
provides that a convicted felon with certain prior felony convictions will
receive a sentence beyond the statutory maximum for the current offense.1
The statute specifically allows for juvenile adjudications to be used as
strikes under certain conditions.2 However, recent case law has complicated the application of this statute. In Apprendi v. New Jersey, the U.S.
Supreme   Court   held  that   “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any
fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory
maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable

J.D. Candidate 2009, Chapman University School of Law; B.A. 2006, Brigham Young University. I would like to thank Clark A. Price, Jarrett Perlow, Ashley Pritchett, Ryan Ortuno, and Kendra
Weber for their insightful comments and assistance; my wife, Jessica, for her love and support; and my
sons, Daniel and Joseph, who were thoughtful enough to wait to be born until their father finished his
article.
1 CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.12 (West Supp. 2008).
2 Id. § 1170.12(b)(3).
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doubt.”3 While most federal circuit courts and California appellate courts
have interpreted the Apprendi “prior  conviction”  exception  to  include  juvenile adjudications,4 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v.
Tighe5 and the Sixth District of the California Court of Appeal in People v.
Nguyen6 held that juvenile adjudications do not fall within the Apprendi
exception. These are not the only courts to reexamine the use of juvenile
adjudications as prior convictions for sentence enhancement purposes.7
The court in Nguyen observed that, while only one law review article argued for the use of  juvenile  adjudications  as  strikes,  “a  growing number of
state courts have taken the view that Apprendi bars the use of juvenile adjudications to enhance adult sentences over and above the otherwise statutorily-set  maximum,” and  that  “[c]ommentators  are  virtually unanimous in
that   view.”8 The California Supreme Court has granted review of the
Nguyen decision,9 and the ruling will have a large impact on whether California  will  join  the  “growing  number”  of  courts  and  commentators  arguing  
for a ban on the use of juvenile adjudications as sentence enhancers.
This Comment first argues that juvenile adjudications should continue
to be used as strikes under the Three Strikes Law, and therefore the California Supreme Court should reverse Nguyen.10 Part I provides a discusApprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) (emphasis added).
See Burge v. United States, 407 F.3d 1183 (11th Cir. 2005); Jones v. United States, 332 F.3d
688 (3d Cir. 2003); Smalley v. United States, 294 F.3d 1030 (8th Cir. 2002); United States v. Crowell,
493 F.3d 744 (6th Cir. 2007); United States v. Matthews, 498 F.3d 25 (1st Cir. 2007). The only federal
circuit to hold that a juvenile adjudication cannot be used as a strike is the Ninth Circuit. United States
v. Tighe, 266 F.3d 1187, 1194 (9th Cir. 2001); see also People v. Linarez, 66 Cal. Rptr. 3d 762, 766
(Ct. App. 2007); People v. Grayson, 66 Cal. Rptr. 3d 603, 610–11 (Ct. App. 2007); People v. Tu, 64
Cal. Rptr. 3d 878, 888 (Ct. App. 2007); People v. Palmer, 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d 864, 870–71 (Ct. App.
2006); People v. Buchanan, 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d 137, 145 (Ct. App. 2006); People v. Superior Court, 7 Cal.
Rtpr. 3d 74, 82 (Ct. App. 2003), review denied, 2004 Cal. LEXIS 2034 (Mar. 3, 2004), cert. denied, 543
U.S. 884 (2004); People v. Lee, 4 Cal. Rptr. 3d 642, 647 (Ct. App. 2003); People v. Smith, 1 Cal. Rptr.
3d 901, 905–06 (Ct. App. 2003).
5 266 F.3d 1187, 1194 (9th Cir. 2001).
6 62 Cal. Rptr. 3d 255, 281 (Ct. App. 2007), review granted, 169 P.3d 882 (Cal. 2007).
7 See State v. Brown, 879 So. 2d 1276, 1290 (La. 2004); Pinkston v. State, 836 N.E.2d 453, 462–
63 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005); State v. Chatman, 2005 WL 901138 at *6 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2005) (unpublished).
8 Nguyen, 62 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 269, 269 n.9 (contrasting several state court decisions with the
views of Kevin Holman, Should   Little   Joey’s   Juvenile   Adjudication   Be   Used   Against   Him   When   He  
Becomes Joe the Habitually Violent Felon?, 25 J. JUV. L. 45 (2005)). In Nguyen, the Sixth District of
the California Court of Appeal decided to follow the trend toward the exclusion of juvenile adjudications as strikes:
[We] join the small but growing number of courts across the county [sic] that have likewise
concluded that Apprendi and its progeny compel us to recognize that the Sixth Amendment
right to a jury trial is an integral part of the process that is due before a prior conviction
may be used to increase the maximum sentence for a criminal offense.
Id. at 256.
9 169 P.3d 882 (Cal. 2007). The United States Supreme Court has consistently denied certiorari
to appeals from cases discussing this issue. See Burge, 407 F.3d 1183, cert. denied, 546 U.S. 981
(2005); Jones, 332 F.3d 688, cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1150 (2004); Smalley, 294 F.3d 1030, cert. denied,
537 U.S. 1114 (2003); Crowell, 493 F.3d 744, cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 880 (2008); Matthews, 498 F.3d
25, cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1463 (2008).
10 I will only focus on the constitutionality of using juvenile adjudications to enhance a sentence
3
4
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sion of the purpose, history, and provisions of the Three Strikes Law. This
part also discusses the unique characteristics of the juvenile justice system
and how these unique characteristics complicate the use of prior juvenile
adjudications as strikes. This part then gives a background of Apprendi,
the cases leading up to Apprendi and how both federal and California
courts have interpreted Apprendi in the context of juvenile adjudications.
Part II argues for the inclusion of juvenile adjudications in Apprendi’s  exception based on (1) the justification for considering recidivism in sentencing; (2) the reliability of juvenile adjudications to indicate recidivism; and
(3) the positive impact of using juvenile adjudications as strikes on the juvenile justice system and society in general. This Comment concludes by
discussing possible future ramifications  of  the  California  Supreme  Court’s  
review of Nguyen, both in California and nationwide.
I. THE THREE STRIKES LAW, THE CALIFORNIA JUVENILE
SYSTEM, AND THE APPRENDI PROBLEM
A.

The History, Purpose, and Provisions of the Three Strikes Law

In 1994, California voters approved Proposition 184 in a general election.11 Proposition 184 was codified in California Penal Code section
1170.12.12 Section 1170.12 is commonly   known   as   “The   Three   Strikes  
Law.”13 Proponents of the Three Strikes Law argued that it would keep society safe from habitual offenders,14 while opponents argued that the Three
Strikes Law would remove  judges’  power  to  keep  sentences  proportional  to
the crime and the criminal.15
beyond the statutory maximum. Precedent clearly states that judges may use juvenile adjudications to
enhance sentences within the statutory limits. United States v. Williams, 891 F.2d 212, 215 (9th Cir.
1989)  (allowing  an  adult’s  criminal  sentence  to  be  enhanced  because  of  a  conviction  at  a  prior  proceeding to which the right to a jury trial did not attach). Nguyen briefly mentions Williams and does not
reject   its   holding.     62   Cal.  Rptr.  3d  at  272   (“[I]n both United States v. Williams and United States v.
Johnson, the defendants were given sentences within the normal range of the federal sentencing guidelines.”).    California  Rules  of  Court  also  include  “the  defendant’s  prior  convictions  as  an  adult  or   sustained petitions in juvenile delinquency proceedings”  as  aggravating  circumstances. CAL. R. CT. 4.421
(West 2007) (emphasis added).
11 Dan Morain & Virginia Ellis, Voters  Approve  ‘Three  Strikes’  Law, Rejecting Smoking Measure, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 9, 1994, at A3.
12 CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.12 (West Supp. 2008).
13 Morain & Ellis, supra note 11.
14 Republican Bill Morrow, incumbent candidate for State Assembly Member, explained:
I am a co-author  and  strongly  support  the  ‘three  strikes’  legislation.    Such  a  law  will  cause  
people inclined to criminal behavior to think twice about committing a crime when they are
assured that commission of a third felony will land them in prison for life. When repeat offenders are jailed for good, the public will be protected from their predation and can rest
assured they will not be loosed upon society again.
Campaign  ’94: Issues and Answers, L.A. TIMES (Orange County Ed.), Oct. 23, 1994, at B3.
15 Tonatiuh Rodriguez-Nikl, also a candidate for State Assembly Member at the time, explained
her opposition:
[The Three Strikes Law] violates the freedom judges must have to ensure that the punishment is proportional to the crime. Violent crime is actually down. Crime hysteria is up and
the  ‘three  strikes’  law  feeds  that  hysteria . . . .    The  ‘three  strikes’  law  would  result  in  filling  
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The Three Strikes Law gives minimum sentence standards for persons
who have already been convicted of one or more felonies.16 If the individual already has one prior felony conviction, the sentence will be double
what the sentence would ordinarily be for the current offense.17 If the individual has two or more prior felony convictions, the sentence for the current offense will be an indeterminate term of life imprisonment with a minimum term of one of the following, whichever is greater:
[1] three times the term otherwise provided as punishment for each current felony conviction subsequent to the two or more prior felony convictions, or [2]
twenty-five years or [3] the term determined by the court pursuant to Section
1170 for the underlying conviction, including any enhancement applicable under
Chapter 4.5 (commencing with Section 1170) of Title 7 of Part 2, or any period
prescribed by Section 190 or 3046.18

The   Three   Strikes   Law   states,   “[a]ny   offense   defined   in   subdivision  
(c) of Section 667.5 [of the California Penal Code] as a violent felony or
any offense defined in subdivision (c) of Section 1192.7 [of the California
Penal  Code]  as  a  serious  felony  in  this  state”  will  qualify  as  a  felony  for  the  
sentence enhancement purposes of the law.19 A prior juvenile adjudication
is a prior felony conviction if:
(A) The juvenile was sixteen years of age or older at the time he or she committed the prior offense, and (B) The prior offense is (i) listed in subdivision (b) of
Section 707 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, or (ii) listed in this subdivision
as a felony, and (C) The juvenile was found to be a fit and proper subject to be
dealt with under the juvenile court law, and (D) The juvenile was adjudged a
ward of the juvenile court within the meaning of Section 602 of the Welfare and
Institutions Code because the person committed an offense listed in subdivision
(b) of Section 707 of the Welfare and Institutions Code.20

B. The Goals and Unique Characteristics of the California Juvenile
Justice System Compared to the Adult Criminal Justice System
In California, the juvenile justice system is significantly different from
the adult criminal justice system. The goals of the juvenile courts are protection and rehabilitation of the minor, rather than punishment.21 One of
up prisons while draining billions of dollars that can be used for social programs. I favor
lighter sentences and more money for education.
Id.

CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.12 (West Supp. 2008).
Id. § 1170.12(c)(1).
Id. § 1170.12(c)(2).
19 Id. § 1170.12(b)(1). California Penal Code section 667.5 includes the following as violent felonies: murder or voluntary manslaughter, mayhem, rape, sodomy. California Penal Code section
1192.7 lists twelve serious felonies, including arson, carjacking, and burglary.
20 Id. § 1170.12(b)(3).
21 NAT’L COUNCIL ON CRIME AND DELINQUENCY, JUVENILE JUSTICE POLICY STATEMENT 3
(Apr. 1991); In re Florance,  300  P.2d  825,  827  (Cal.  1956)  (en  banc)  (“The  primary consideration in
proceedings  to  declare  a  minor  a  ward  of  the  juvenile  court  is  the  minor’s  welfare.”);;  In re Charles C.,
284  Cal.  Rptr.  4,  5  (Ct.  App.  1991)  (“[A]  juvenile  commitment  is  geared  toward  treatment  and  rehabilitation with the state providing substitute parental care for wayward youths during their minority.”)  (em16
17
18
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the ways the system protects the minor is with proceedings that are by design less formal and intimidating than their adult counterparts.22 The proceedings are not criminal in nature23 and juveniles are not convicted, but
deemed to be a ward of the court.24 The delinquent juvenile is not sentenced, but the court conducts a disposition hearing to determine what outcome will best serve the juvenile.25 Punishments range from the juvenile
being sent home to his or her parents26 to being committed in a detention
facility operated by the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile Facilities, for a period of time not to exceed the
equivalent sentence for the same offense in an adult proceeding.27
California also allows a minor the opportunity to seal his or her
record. Under California law, juveniles may petition the court to have their
records sealed when they reach the age of eighteen or five years after the
juvenile   court’s   jurisdiction   terminates.28 This option is not available for
juveniles tried in adult criminal court, but they may have their records expunged after an honorable discharge from a youth authority facility.29 This
allows rehabilitated juveniles the opportunity to avoid difficulties in obtaining   employment   because   it   erases   a   juvenile’s   conviction   from   his   or   her  
record.
Traditionally, the due process rights afforded to adults in criminal
courts have not been given to juveniles, because the goal of the juvenile
justice system is rehabilitation and not punishment.30 However, in In re
Gault, the U.S. Supreme Court held that juveniles in juvenile proceedings
have the right to counsel, the right to receive notice of charges, the privilege against self-incrimination, and the right to confront and cross-examine
witnesses.31 Three  years  later,  the  Court  held  that  a  juvenile’s  guilt  must  be  
phasis in original).
22 In re Charles C., 284 Cal. Rptr. at 6.
23 People  v.  Arias,  51  Cal.  Rptr.  2d  770,  817  (Ct.  App.  1996)  (“Juvenile  proceedings  are  not  criminal  prosecutions.”).
24 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 602 (West Supp. 2008).
25 Id. § 706.
26 Id. § 727(a).
27 Id. § 731.
28 Id. § 781(a). One observer notes that, under the Three Strikes Law, a sealed juvenile adjudication can still be used as a strike:
The sealed record statute provides that if the juvenile committed an offense under section
707(b) of the Welfare and Institutions Code, the record will not be sealed until six years after the last offense. This is specifically applicable to the 'three strikes' law which allows
juvenile offenses committed under section 707(b) to be used as strikes. However, the three
strikes law has no limit on how far back it may look for use of a prior juvenile adjudication.
The juvenile adjudication could have taken place twenty years ago, and the prosecution
may still use it to constitute a strike. This is in direct opposition to the sealed record statute, which states once a record is sealed, "the proceedings shall be deemed never to have
occurred . . . .”
Tonya K. Cole, Counting Juvenile Adjudications as Strikes Under California's 'Three Strikes' Law: An
Undermining of the Separateness of the Adult and Juvenile Systems, 19 J. Juv. L. 335, 344–45 (1998).
29 Holman, supra note 8 at 47; CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 1772 (West Supp. 2008).
30 See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 553 (1971) (plurality opinion).
31 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
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proven beyond a reasonable doubt rather than by a preponderance of the
evidence.32 Juveniles are also protected against double jeopardy.33 However, in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, the Court held that not all due process
rights enjoyed by adults are required in juvenile proceedings.34 The Court
concluded that jury trials are not required in juvenile hearings because they
would disrupt the intimate nature of the juvenile proceedings and are not
necessary for accurate fact-finding.35 The Court emphasized that its decision gives the states discretion to decide whether juveniles are afforded a
jury trial.36 However, California does not require jury trials in juvenile
proceedings because juvenile proceedings are reformatory in nature and not
penal.37
On March 8, 2000, Proposition 21 became law and gave prosecutors
greater ability to try juveniles in adult criminal court.38 Juveniles in California who are at least fourteen years of age and charged with murder or
certain sexual assault crimes must be tried as an adult in criminal court.39
Prosecutors may choose between criminal or juvenile court when a juvenile
of at least sixteen years of age commits any offense listed in California
Welfare & Institutions Code section 707(b).40 Prosecutors can also file
charges in criminal court against any juvenile that is sixteen years of age or
older and has a prior felony adjudication.41
Proposition 21 reduces the number of juvenile adjudications that can
be used as strikes.42 However, there are still many juvenile offenses that
can be used as strikes that either cannot be charged in adult proceedings at
all,43 or where prosecutors have a choice between adult and juvenile
court.44
32 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). This is important, because the reliability of prior convictions is questioned when the standard of proof is less than beyond a reasonable doubt. In Apprendi, the
United States Supreme Court only stated what does constitute sufficient procedural safeguards (a right
to a trial by jury and proof beyond a reasonable doubt) and what does not (judge-made findings under a
lesser standard of proof). Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 476 (2000).
33 Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 541 (1975).
34 McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 533.
35 Id. at 550.
36 Id. at 553.
37 Id. at 568.
38 Anthony Costanzo, Proposition 21: The Future of an Illusion, 24 J. JUV. L. 68, 73 n.41 (2004).
Proposition 21 amended section 777 of the California Welfare and Institutions Code. Id. at 68.
39 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 602(b) (West Supp. 2008).
40 Id. § 707(d)(1). These offenses include murder, robbery, torture, kidnapping, etc. Id. § 707(b).
41 Id. § 707(d)(3). The prior felony must have been committed when he or she was fourteen years
of age or older. Id.
42 Holman, supra note 8.
43 These are the offenses that qualify as strikes under California Penal Code sections 667.5 or
1192.7 that are not listed in California Welfare and Institutions Code sections 602(b) (the prosecutor
must try the case in adult criminal court) or 707(b) (the prosecutor may try the case in adult criminal
court). Some offenses include non-aggravated mayhem, kidnapping with-out bodily harm or ransom,
and extortion.
44 If the offense is a strike and is listed under California Welfare and Institutions Code section
707(b), the prosecutor has discretion to try the case in adult criminal court under California Welfare and
Institutions Code section 707(d)(1) (2008). Examples of these offenses are arson, assault with a fire-
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The U.S. Supreme Court and Almendarez-Torres, Jones, and
Apprendi—Enhancing a Sentence Beyond the Statutory Maximum
with Prior Convictions

In Almendarez-Torres v. United States, the Supreme Court held that
prior convictions could be treated as sentencing factors that raise the maximum penalty of an offense.45 In September 1995, Hugo AlmendarezTorres was indicted by a federal grand jury for a violation of 8 U.S.C. section 1326(a), which makes it a crime for a deported alien to return to the
United States.46 Without a prior conviction, the maximum prison term is
two years.47 Section 1326(b)(2) authorizes a maximum prison term of
twenty  years  if  the  initial  deportation  “was  subsequent  to  a  conviction for
commission   of   an   aggravated   felony.”48 Almendarez-Torres pled guilty
and admitted in a hearing that he had been deported pursuant to three convictions for aggravated felonies.49
Almendarez-Torres argued that the prior aggravated felony convictions were elements of a crime, and because the government failed to include the prior convictions in the indictment, he could not be sentenced
beyond the statutory maximum of two years as set forth in Section
1326(a).50 The district court rejected this argument and gave AlmendarezTorres a prison term, ranging from seventy-seven to ninety-six months.
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the verdict.51 The Supreme Court agreed and
found that an indictment does not need to set forth sentencing factors52 because a prior conviction is a sentencing factor and not a separate element of
a crime.53
One year later, in Jones v. United States, the Court further explained
the reason for allowing a prior conviction to serve as a sentence enhancement, rather than an element of the crime that must be proven to a jury. 54
Nathaniel Jones was indicted for a violation of 18 U.S.C. section 2119,55
which stated that a person possessing a firearm who takes a motor vehicle
from another person by force will receive a sentence of not more than fifteen years in prison.56 However, Section 2119(2) states that if serious bodily injury resulted, the punishment was not to exceed twenty-five years.57
arm, torture, kidnapping for ransom, etc.
45 523 U.S. 224, 246–47 (1998).
46 Id. at 227; 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) (2006).
47 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) (2006).
48 Id. § 1326(b)(2).
49 Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 227.
50 Id.; see also Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117 (1974) (holding that an indictment
must set forth each element of the crime).
51 Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 227.
52 Id. at 228.
53 Id. at 243.
54 526 U.S. 227, 251–52 (1999).
55 Id. at 230.
56 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (1988).
57 Id.

PRICE

12/22/2008 1:19 PM

114

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 11:107

Although Section 2119(2) was not included in the jury instructions defining
the offense, the district court sentenced Jones to the full twenty-five years
permitted under subsection (2).58 The district court held that subsection (2)
was  a  sentencing  factor,  rejecting  Jones’  argument  that  it  set  out  an  element  
of the offense and could not be applied because it had not been charged in
his indictment.59 The Ninth Circuit affirmed this decision.60
The Supreme Court, however, reversed the district court and the Ninth
Circuit because the fact of severe bodily harm was not charged in the indictment and tried before the jury.61 In this particular case, the aggravating
factor was not a prior conviction but the presence of severe bodily harm resulting from carjacking. The Court explained that prior convictions are
constitutionally distinct from other sentence-enhancing factors, and therefore could be used under Almendarez-Torres to increase the penalty for an
offense without treating them as an element of the current offense.62 It clarified   that,   “unlike   virtually   any   other   consideration   used   to   enlarge   the  
possible penalty for an offense, and certainly unlike the factor before us in
this case, a prior conviction must itself have been established through procedures satisfying the fair notice, reasonable doubt, and jury trial guarantees.”63
One year later in Apprendi, the Supreme Court further clarified the rationale in Almendarez-Torres and Jones.64 On December 22, 1994, Charles
Apprendi fired several bullets into the home of an African-American family that had recently moved into an all-white neighborhood.65 Apprendi
made a statement, which he later retracted, that suggested that his motive
was race-based.66 Apprendi   pleaded   guilty   to   two   counts   of   “seconddegree possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose, and one count of
the third-degree offense of unlawful possession of an antipersonnel
bomb.”67 As a part of the plea agreement, the prosecution reserved the
right to request the court to impose an enhanced sentence if the crime was
committed with a biased purpose pursuant to a state hate-crime statute.68
After accepting the pleas, the prosecutor filed a motion to enhance the sentence and the court held an evidentiary hearing to determine if the shooting
was committed with a biased purpose.69 The   court  found   “that  the  crime  
was motivated by racial   bias”   and   applied   the   hate   crime   enhancement.70
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70

Jones, 526 U.S. at 231.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 231–33.
Id. at 249.
Id.
530 U.S. 466, 487–90 (2000).
Id. at 469.
Id.
Id. at 469–70 (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 470.
Id.
Id. at 471 (internal quotations omitted).
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The Appellate Division and New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed.71
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the New Jersey courts because the
issue of whether Apprendi had a racial motive in committing the crime had
not been submitted to a jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt.72 The
Court explained that the reason the judge in Almendarez-Torres could consider the prior conviction as a sentence enhancer without violating due
process and Sixth Amendment concerns was because procedural safeguards
attached to the fact of the prior conviction.73 The Court established the following   rule:   “Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum
must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable  doubt.”74
D. How Federal and California Courts Have Approached the Problem of
Whether it is Appropriate to Include Prior Juvenile Adjudications
Under the Apprendi Exception
In California, the Three Strikes Law allows judges to enhance sentences beyond the statutory maximum because of prior convictions.75 Previously, courts in California held that the use of juvenile adjudications as
strikes complies with Apprendi’s  rule.76 However, there is now disagreement among the California courts of appeal on this issue.77 There is also
disagreement among the federal circuit courts. Six federal circuit courts
have now ruled on the issue of whether juvenile adjudications qualify as
convictions for purposes of the Apprendi exception.78 The U.S. Supreme
Court has yet to decide the issue.79
The Ninth Circuit was the first to decide the issue. In United States v.
Tighe, the Ninth Circuit held that a juvenile adjudication does not fall under
the Apprendi exception unless it was proved to a jury beyond a reasonable
doubt.80 The court relied on the following language from Jones:  “[U]nlike
virtually any other consideration used to enlarge the possible penalty for an
Id. at 471–72.
Id. at 497.
Id. at 488.
Id. at 490 (emphasis added).
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.12 (West 2004).
See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490.
See People v. Nguyen, 62 Cal. Rptr. 3d 255, 280 (2007).
See United States v. Burge, 407 F.3d 1183, 1191 (11th Cir. 2005) (allowing juvenile adjudications to be used as sentence-enhancing prior convictions); United States v. Jones, 332 F.3d 688, 696 (3d
Cir. 2003) (same); United States v. Smalley, 294 F.3d 1030, 1033 (8th Cir. 2002) (same); United States
v. Crowell, 493 F.3d 744, 750 (6th Cir. 2007) (same); United States v. Matthews, 498 F.3d 25, 36 (1st
Cir. 2007) (same); United States v. Tighe, 266 F.3d 1187, 1194–95 (9th Cir. 2001) (excluding
“[j]uvenile   adjudications   that   do   not   afford   the   right   to   a   jury   trial   and   a   beyond-a-reasonable-doubt
burden  of  proof”  from  use    as  sentence-enhancing prior convictions).
79 See Burge, 407 F.3d 1183, cert. denied, 546 U.S. 981 (2005); Jones, 332 F.3d 688, cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1150 (2004); Smalley, 294 F.3d 1030, cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1114 (2003); Crowell, 493
F.3d 744, cert. denied, 128 S.Ct. 880 (2008); Matthews, 498 F.3d 25, cert. denied, 128 S.Ct. 1463
(2008).
80 266 F.3d at 1194.
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
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offense . . . a prior conviction must itself have been established through
procedures satisfying the fair notice, reasonable doubt, and jury trial guarantees.”81 The court reasoned that the Supreme Court created an exception
for prior convictions because those prior convictions were themselves established through procedural safeguards.82 The court then concluded that
because of the language of Jones, a right to a jury trial is indispensable for
a prior conviction to be used to enhance a sentence beyond the statutory
maximum.83 To date, the Ninth Circuit is the only circuit court to hold this
view.
The Eighth Circuit was the next circuit court to decide the issue. In
2002, it held in U.S. v. Smalley that juvenile adjudications fall under the
Apprendi exception.84 The court relied on the following language from
Apprendi:
[T]here is a vast difference between accepting the validity of a prior judgment of
conviction entered in a proceeding in which the defendant had the right to a jury
trial and the right to require the prosecutor to prove guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt, and allowing the judge to find the required fact under a lesser standard of
proof.85

The court noted that the Supreme Court clearly stated what falls within the Apprendi exception, but the Court did not take a clear position on
other possibilities.86 The Eighth Circuit also found it significant that the
Supreme Court in Apprendi didn’t  quote  the  Jones decision relied on by the
Ninth Circuit in Tighe.87 The Eighth Circuit observed that the Supreme
Court in Apprendi only discussed the right to a trial by jury and proof
beyond a reasonable doubt as examples of procedural protections, not mandatory indicators of reliability.88 The Eighth Circuit then stated that the
question  “should  not  turn  on  the  narrow  parsing  of  words,  but  on  an  examination of whether juvenile adjudications, like adult convictions, are so reliable that due process of law is not offended by such  an  exemption.”89 The
court then listed the procedural protections that juveniles do enjoy in juvenile  proceedings:    “The right to notice, the right to counsel, the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, and the privilege against selfincrimination.”90 The court further observed that judges in juvenile proceedings have to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,91 concluding that the
combination of these protections is sufficient to provide the reliability that
81

Jones).
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91

Id. at 1193 (quoting Jones, 526 U.S. at 249) (emphasis removed to match original opinion of
Id. at 1194.
Id.
Smalley, 294 F.3d at 1033.
Id. at 1032; Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 496.
Smalley, 294 F.3d at 1032.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1033.
Id.
Id.
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Apprendi requires.92 Finally, the court noted  that  “the  use  of  a  jury  in  the  
juvenile   context   would   ‘not   strengthen   greatly,   if   at   all,   the   factfinding  
function’   and   is   not   constitutionally   required.”93 Four circuit courts have
followed the reasoning in Smalley.94
The California courts have followed the pattern of their federal counterparts. The California Supreme Court, like the United States Supreme
Court, has not decided the issue.95 The California appellate courts agree
with the reasoning in Smalley, with one exception.96 The first California
appellate court to decide the issue was the Second District. In People v.
Bowden, the court held that non-jury trial juvenile adjudications can be
used to enhance a sentence in an adult proceeding beyond the statutory
maximum.97 The court cited to the dissent in Tighe:
We agree with the Tighe dissent that this language in Jones does not support such
a   broad   conclusion.      The   dissent   stated,   “In   my   view,   the   language   in   Jones
stands for the basic proposition that Congress has the constitutional power to
treat prior convictions as sentencing factors subject to a lesser standard of proof
because the defendant presumably received all the process that was due when he
was convicted of the predicate crime. For adults, this would indeed include the
right to a jury trial. For juveniles, it does not. Extending Jones’  logic  to  juvenile
adjudications, when a juvenile receives all the process constitutionally due at the
juvenile stage, there is no constitutional problem (on which Apprendi focused) in
using that adjudication to support a later sentencing  enhancement.”98

Subsequent California courts of appeal have agreed with Bowden.99
However, in People v. Nguyen, the Sixth District of the California
Court of Appeal held that a juvenile adjudication is not a prior conviction
within the Apprendi exception.100 The court noted that, while all the appellate courts to consider the issue have held that juvenile adjudications fall
within the Apprendi exception,  “a  growing  number  of  state  courts  have  taken the view that Apprendi bars the use of juvenile adjudications to enhance
adult sentences over and above the otherwise statutorily set  maximum.”101
Id.
Id. (quoting McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 547 (1971) (plurality opinion)).
See United States v. Jones, 332 F.3d 688, 696 (3rd Cir. 2003); United States v. Burge, 407 F.3d
1183, 1190 (11th Cir. 2005); United States v. Crowell, 493 F.3d 744, 750 (6th Cir. 2007); United States
v. Matthews, 498 F.3d 25, 35 (1st Cir. 2007).
95 See People v. Nguyen, 62 Cal. Rptr. 3d 255 (Ct. App. 2007), review granted, 169 P.3d 882
(Cal. 2007).
96 Id. at 269–70.
97 People v. Bowden, 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d 513, 518 (Ct. App. 2002).
98 Id. (citing United States v. Tighe, 266 F.3d 1187, 1200 (9th Cir. 2001) (Brunetti, J., dissenting)).
99 See People v. Linarez, 66 Cal. Rptr. 3d 762, 766 (Ct. App. 2007); People v. Grayson, 66 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 603, 610–11 (Ct. App. 2007); People v. Tu, 64 Cal. Rptr. 3d 878, 888 (Ct. App. 2007); People
v. Palmer, 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d 864, 870–71 (Ct. App. 2006); People v. Buchanan, 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d 137,
145 (Ct. App. 2006); People v. Superior Court, 7 Cal. Rtpr. 3d 74, 82 (Ct. App. 2003), review denied
2004 Cal. LEXIS 2034 (Mar. 3, 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 884 (2004); People v. Lee, 4 Cal. Rptr. 3d
642, 647 (Ct. App. 2003); People v. Smith, 1 Cal. Rptr. 3d 901, 905–06 (Ct. App. 2003).
100 62 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 256–57.
101 Id. at 269 (citing State v. Brown, 879 So. 2d 1276, 1290 (La. 2004); Pinkston v. State, 836
92
93
94
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The  court  also  stated  that  “[c]ommentators  are  virtually  unanimous in that
view.”102
The court justified its holding by rejecting three of the most common
arguments in favor of including prior juvenile adjudications in the Apprendi exception. First, the court rejected the argument that recidivism is different than other facts that enhance sentences.103 The court observed that
Apprendi does not specifically except recidivism, but only prior convictions.104 Moreover, the court stressed that there is a difference between using recidivism to enhance a sentence within the statutory limits, and using it
to enhance beyond those limits.105 Additionally, the court objected to what
it saw as an unwarranted assumption that juvenile adjudications prove recidivism.106
The court rejected the second argument that juvenile adjudications are
reliable enough to be included within Apprendi’s   exception.107 First, the
court responded to the argument that, because juries in juvenile adjudications were deemed to be unnecessary in McKeiver, they do not increase reliability for Apprendi purposes.108 The court stated that the inability of the
jury to add additional accuracy in fact-finding is not the real reason there is
no constitutional right to a jury trial in juvenile adjudications.109 The court
explained that juries would destroy the rehabilitative function and intimate
atmosphere of juvenile adjudications.110 Second, the court cited statistical
reports included in Ballew v. Georgia,111 which suggested that the lower
the number of jurors, the lower the reliability of the verdict.112 The court
implied, contrary  to  the  Supreme  Court’s  holding  in   McKeiver, that juries
would add reliability and accuracy to fact-finding in a juvenile proceeding.113
Third, the court rejected the view that juries are not indispensable to
due process in the context of sentencing above the statutory maximum. 114
The court discussed various ways in which the trial by jury is a fundamental part of the American criminal justice system.115 In the context of enN.E.2d 453 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (unpublished); State v. Chatman, 2005 WL 901138 (Tenn. Crim. App.
2005)).
102 Id. The court then observed that only one law review article argues in support of the inclusion
of juvenile adjudications within the Apprendi exception. Id. at n.9; see Holman, supra note 8, at 54–55.
103 Nguyen, 62 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 270.
104 Id. at 271.
105 Id.
106 Id. at 272–73.
107 Id. at 273.
108 Id.
109 Id.
110 Id.
111 435 U.S. 223 (1978).
112 Nguyen, 62 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 274.
113 Id. at 275. In McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, the U.S. Supreme Court held that juries would add
little reliability and accuracy in fact-finding in a juvenile proceeding. 403 U.S. 528, 553 (1971).
114 Nguyen, 62 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 276–77.
115 Id.

PRICE

2008]

12/22/2008 1:19 PM

The Use of Juvenile Adjudications as Strikes

119

hancing a sentence beyond the statutory maximum, the court, like the Ninth
Circuit in Tighe, relied on the language from Jones that discusses the right
to a trial by jury and proof beyond a reasonable doubt.116 The court concluded that, because juvenile adjudications are not prior convictions within
the Apprendi exception, they cannot be used pursuant to the Three Strikes
Law to enhance a sentence in an adult proceeding beyond the statutory
maximum.117
Since Nguyen, three other California courts of appeal have criticized
its reasoning.118 Thus, there is a split among both the federal and California appellate courts concerning whether a prior juvenile adjudication can be
used to enhance a sentence in an adult proceeding beyond the statutory
maximum. The split among the California courts will soon be resolved, as
the California Supreme Court has granted review.119
II. JUDGES ACT IN ACCORDANCE WITH APPRENDI BY USING
JUVENILE ADJUDICATIONS AS STRIKES IN CALIFORNIA
The California Supreme Court should reverse Nguyen and hold that
juvenile adjudications are appropriately included within the Apprendi exception. Recidivism continues to be the most traditional reason for sentence enhancement.120 Juvenile adjudications are sufficiently reliable to indicate recidivism and are accompanied by a multiplicity of procedural
protections.121 Furthermore, using juvenile adjudications to enhance adult
sentences promotes the rehabilitative purpose of the juvenile justice system
and has a positive impact on society through the deterrence of future crimes
and incarceration of recidivists.122
A. Juvenile Adjudications Can Be Included Within Apprendi’s  Exception  
Because Recidivism is a Traditional Basis for Sentence Enhancement
Juvenile adjudications can be used to enhance a sentence in an adult
criminal proceeding because they indicate recidivism and recidivism is the
most traditional basis for sentence enhancement.123 Recidivism   “demonstrates beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant has engaged in serious
criminal   behavior   in   the   past.”124 Recidivism   “is   a   traditional,   if   not   the  
most  traditional,  basis  for  a  sentencing  court’s  increasing  an  offender’s  sen-

Id. at 277.
Id. at 278–79.
118 People v. Tu, 64 Cal. Rptr. 3d 878, 888 (Ct. App. 2007); People v. Grayson, 66 Cal. Rptr. 3d
603, 609–10 (Ct. App. 2007); People v. Linarez, 66 Cal. Rptr. 3d 762, 766 (Ct. App. 2007).
119 People v. Nguyen, 67 Cal. Rptr. 3d 460 (2007).
120 Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 243 (1998).
121 E.g., People v. Grayson, 66 Cal. Rptr. 3d 603, 610–11 (Ct. App. 2007).
122 See discussion infra Part III.C.
123 People v. Nguyen, 62 Cal. Rptr. 3d 255, 271 (Ct. App. 2007) (citing People v. Fowler, 84 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 874, 877 n.2 (Ct. App. 1999)).
124 Fowler, 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 877. (internal citations omitted).
116
117
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tence.”125 It  is  therefore  “distinguishable for constitutional purposes from
other  facts  that  might  extend  the  range  of  possible  sentencing.”126 Recidivism is appropriately considered for sentencing  because  it  “demonstrates  the  
defendant’s  character  and  the  likelihood  of  future  criminality.”127
However, Nguyen observes that there is a difference between using recidivism to enhance a sentence within the statutory limits and using recidivism to enhance a sentence beyond the statutory limits.128 Apprendi’s  general rule against letting a judge use a fact to enhance a sentence beyond the
statutory maximum contains an exception for prior convictions.129 Nguyen
found that the critical issue is how narrowly Apprendi’s  exception should
be interpreted—whether the offense being used to enhance beyond statutory limits has to be a conviction in name, or whether it can be another offense found by a reasonable doubt (such as a juvenile adjudication) that indicates recidivism.130 Prior convictions are excepted from Apprendi’s  rule,  
not because they are called convictions, but because of what they
represent—a finding of guilt following all procedural protections due to the
defendant. Therefore, so long as judgments indicating recidivism carry
with them sufficient procedural protections, judges may use them to enhance a sentence beyond the statutory maximum.
Do juvenile adjudications indicate recidivism? The court in Nguyen
had a problem with using juvenile adjudications as strikes because it believes that juvenile adjudications do not carry sufficient procedural protections to reliably indicate recidivism.131 But if juvenile adjudications are
found to be sufficiently reliable, then they indicate recidivism because they
show evidence of prior criminal wrongdoing by the defendant. Therefore,
the next issue to be considered is whether juvenile adjudications are reliable enough to indicate recidivism.

Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 243.
Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 249 (1999).
Ellen Marrus, “That  Isn’t  Fair,  Judge”:  The  Costs  of  Using  Prior  Juvenile  Delinquency Adjudications in Criminal Court Sentencing, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 1323, 1339 (2004). At times, defendants
will argue that using a prior conviction to enhance the penalty for the current offense violates the constitutional protection against double jeopardy. The United States Supreme Court has explained that it is
not the former offense that the defendant is being punished for again, but rather the current offense. See
Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728, 732 (1948) (explaining that the enhancement on the subsequent offense
“is  a  stiffened  penalty  for  the  latest  crime,  which  is  considered  to  be  an  aggravated offense because [it
is] a repetitive  one”).
128 Nguyen,  62  Cal.  Rptr.  3d  at  271  (finding  a  distinction  between  “‘factors  relating  both  to  offense
and  the  offender’  that  judges  may  constitutionally  consider  ‘in  imposing  a  judgment   within the range
prescribed  by   statute’   and   unconstitutional   consideration   of   factors   that   mandate   imposition   of   a   sentence greater than the maximum sentence authorized  by  the  jury’s  verdict”  (quoting  Apprendi  v.  New  
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 481 (2000) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis in original)).
129 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490.
130 Nguyen,  62  Cal.  Rptr.  3d  at  271  (“[W]e  see  the  question  before  us  as   whether  ‘prior  convictions’  ought  to  be  interpreted  expansively  to  include  other  judgments,  which  are  by  definition  not criminal or  convictions,  but  which  do  reflect  recidivism.”).
131 Id. at 272–73.
125
126
127
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Juvenile Adjudications are Sufficiently Reliable to Indicate
Recidivism and be Included Under Apprendi’s  Exception  Because  
They Contain Sufficient Procedural Safeguards

A majority of the California courts of appeal that have decided the issue agree that juvenile adjudications are sufficiently reliable to be used as a
prior conviction within the Apprendi exception.132 Likewise, a majority of
the federal circuits that have decided the issue also agree that juvenile adjudications are sufficiently reliable for sentence enhancement beyond the
statutory maximum.133
Juvenile adjudications carry with them a full range of procedural protections. Therefore, they are reliable enough to indicate recidivism and enhance a sentence beyond the statutory maximum. 134 Juveniles have the
right to counsel, the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, and the
privilege against self-incrimination.135 Especially noteworthy is that the
standard of proof in a juvenile proceeding is guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt.136 Apprendi mentions this as one of the reasons adult convictions
are reliable enough to be excepted from the general rule for sentence enhancers.137 Additionally, juveniles are protected from double jeopardy.138
These are all important protections that make juvenile adjudications more
reliable.
132 See People v. Smith, 1 Cal. Rptr. 3d 901, 905 (Ct. App. 2003); People v. Lee, 4 Cal. Rptr. 3d
642, 647 (Ct. App. 2003); People v. Superior Court (Andrades), 7 Cal. Rptr. 3d 74, 86 (Ct. App. 2003);
People v. Buchanan, 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d 137, 145 (Ct. App. 2006); People v. Palmer, 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d 864,
871 (Ct. App. 2006); People v. Tu, 64 Cal. Rptr. 3d 878, 887–88 (Ct. App. 2007); People v. Grayson,
66 Cal. Rptr. 3d 603, 610–11 (Ct. App. 2007); People v. Linarez, 66 Cal. Rptr. 3d 762, 766–67 (Ct.
App. 2007).
133 See United States v. Smalley, 294 F.3d 1030, 1033 (8th Cir. 2002); United States v. Jones, 332
F.3d 688, 696 (3d Cir. 2003); United States v. Burge, 407 F.3d 1183, 1190–91 (11th Cir. 2005); United
States v. Crowell, 493 F.3d 744, 750 (6th Cir. 2007); United States v. Matthews, 498 F.3d 25, 35–36
(1st Cir. 2007).
134 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 488; Smalley, 294 F.3d at 1033 (concluding that the question  is  “whether  
juvenile adjudications, like adult convictions, are so reliable that due process of law is not offended by
such an exception [to Apprendi’s general  rule].”).    In  his  dissenting  opinion  in   Tighe, Justice Brunetti
explained:
In my view, the language in Jones stands for the basic proposition that Congress has the
constitutional power to treat prior convictions as sentencing factors subject to a lesser standard of proof because the defendant presumably received all the process that was due when
he was convicted of the predicate crime. For adults, this would indeed include the right to
a jury trial. For juveniles, it does not.
United States v. Tighe, 266 F.3d 1187, 1200 (9th Cir. 2001) (Brunetti, J., dissenting). Even the majority opinion in Tighe recognized that it is the reliability of the prior conviction that makes it the exception
to Apprendi’s  rule:
Thus, Jones’   recognition   of   prior   convictions   as  a  constitutionally   permissible   sentencing  
factor was rooted in the concept that prior convictions have been, by their very nature, subject to the fundamental triumvirate of procedural protections intended to guarantee the reliability of criminal convictions: fair notice, reasonable doubt and the right to a jury trial.
Id. at 1193 (emphasis added).
135 Smalley, 294 F.3d at 1033.
136 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 367 (1970).
137 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 488.
138 Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 541 (1975).
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Opponents of using juvenile adjudications as strikes often cite the Supreme   Court’s   language   in   Jones that discusses the right to a trial by
jury.139 For example,  the  Ninth  Circuit  held  that  the  “exception  to  Apprendi’s  general  rule  must  be  limited  to  prior  convictions  that  were  themselves  
obtained through proceedings that included the right to a jury trial and
proof  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt.”140 However, the Supreme Court in Apprendi only stated that the right to a trial by jury and proof beyond a reasonable doubt constitute sufficient procedural safeguards, while judgemade findings under a lesser standard of proof do not.141 The Court did not
determine the reliability of situations that are between these two poles.142
The Eighth Circuit explained:  “In  other  words,  we  think  that  it  is  incorrect  
to  assume  that  it  is  not  only  sufficient  but  necessary  that  the  ‘fundamental  
triumvirate of procedural protections . . . underly an adjudication before it
can qualify for the Apprendi exemption.”143 Furthermore, the United States
Supreme Court has held that juries are not necessary in juvenile proceedings because they add little to the reliability of the verdict:
The imposition of the jury trial on the juvenile court system would not strengthen
greatly, if at all, the factfinding function, and would, contrarily, provide an attrition   of   the   juvenile   court’s   assumed   ability   to   function   in   a   unique   manner.      It  
would not remedy the defects of the system. Meager as has been the hoped-for
advance in the juvenile field, the alternative would be regressive, would lose
what has been gained, and would tend once again to place the juvenile squarely
in the routine of the criminal process.144

Despite the holding in McKeiver, the Sixth District California Court of
Appeal in Nguyen attempts to cast doubt on it by citing Ballew v. Georgia.145 In Ballew, the Court discussed studies showing that the smaller the
number of jurors, the less reliable the verdict.146 The studies, published in
1963, concern reliability based on the number of jurors in adult proceedings, not the reliability of a verdict in a bench trial in juvenile proceedings.147 Nguyen also attempts to distinguish McKeiver:
139 Tighe,  266  F.3d  at  1193  (“[U]nlike  virtually  any  other  consideration  used  to  enlarge  the  possible penalty for an offense . . . a prior conviction must itself have been established through procedures
satisfying the fair notice, reasonable doubt, and jury trial guarantees.”)   (quoting Jones, 526 U.S. at
249); see also People v. Nguyen, 62 Cal. Rptr. 3d 255, 280–81  (Ct.  App.  2007)  (holding  “that  a  juvenile
adjudication is not a prior conviction within the meaning of Apprendi because the juvenile offender
does  not  have  the  right  to  a  jury  trial.”).
140 Tighe, 266 F.3d at 1194.
141 United States v. Smalley, 294 F.3d 1030, 1032 (8th Cir. 2002) (citing Apprendi, 530 U.S. at
488).
142 Id.
143 Id. This so-called   “triumvirate  of  procedural  protections”  is  only  a  list  of  examples, and the
Ninth  Circuit  has  stated  that   “[t]he   right   to  counsel   [which   juveniles   have   in  juvenile   proceedings]   is  
more fundamental than the  right  to  a  jury  trial.”    United  States  v.  Williams, 891 F.2d 212, 215 (9th Cir.
1989).
144 McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 547 (1971) (emphasis added).
145 People v. Nguyen, 62 Cal. Rptr. 3d 255, 274–75 (Ct. App. 2007) (citing Ballew v. Georgia,
435 U.S. 223, 232–33 (1978)).
146 Ballew, 435 U.S. at 232–33.
147 Id. at 233 n.11 (citing Edwin J. Thomas & Clinton F. Fink, Effects of Group Size, 60 PSYCHOL.
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The lesson we draw from Ballew and McKeiver is not that judicial fact-finding is
unreliable—clearly, it is reliable enough to afford due process where juvenile
dispositions are the outcome of the adjudicative process—but that, in the absence
of a jury waiver, only jury fact-finding by six or more persons deliberating together is reliable enough to afford due process in non-petty criminal cases, where
the outcome of the adjudicative process is imprisonment. 148

However, because judicial fact-finding is sufficiently reliable to deprive juveniles of their physical liberty, it is also sufficiently reliable to enhance  an  adult’s  sentence  so  long  as  it  was  accompanied by the procedural
protections due in a juvenile proceeding.149
Nguyen next   declares,   “[w]henever  the  length  of   a  sentence imposed
on an adult offender is involved, the case is by definition criminal, and it
implicates  the  Sixth  Amendment’s right  to  a  jury  trial.”150 The court further  states  that  “a  criminal  sentence  must  reflect  the  judgment  of  a  jury  of  
at least six members, even if it is a prior conviction, unless that jury is
waived.”151 Other California courts of appeal disagree with this assertion
and argue that the Three Strikes Law does not convert a juvenile adjudication  into  an  adult  criminal  conviction:  “The  three strikes  law’s  use  of  juvenile adjudications affects only the length of the sentence imposed on an
adult offender, not the finding of guilt in the adult court nor the adjudication  process  in  the  juvenile  court.”152 Moreover,  “[t]he  [United  States  Supreme] Court specifically has recognized by dictum that a jury is not a necessary part even of every criminal  process  that  is  fair  and  equitable.”153
Not only is judicial fact-finding generally reliable, it is accompanied
by a wide range of other procedural protections in a juvenile proceeding,
including a burden of proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore,
juvenile adjudications are sufficiently reliable for Apprendi purposes.
BULL. 371, 373 (1963)).
148 Nguyen, 62 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 275.
149 The Ninth Circuit also came to this conclusion with regard to enhancing a sentence within the
statutory limits. United States v. Williams,  891  F.2d  212,  215  (9th  Cir.  1989)  (“If  it  does  not  violate  
due process for a juvenile to be deprived of his or her liberty without a jury trial, we fail to find a violation of due process when a later deprivation of liberty is enhanced  due  to  this  juvenile  adjudication.”).
150 Nguyen, 62 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 275. The court continued:
When the Three Strikes law uses the fact of a prior juvenile adjudication to enhance a sentence, it is doing so for the purpose of enhancing an adult defendant's sentence, and it is
bound by the rules that govern criminal cases. . . . By  letting  a  juvenile  adjudication  ”stand  
in”   for   “evidence   of   past   criminal   conduct”   the   law   is   relying on the judgment of a fact
finder that is constitutionally unacceptable in a criminal case in the absence of the defendant's waiver.
Id.
151 Id. at 276. Of course, judges issue sentences every day based on facts not tried before a jury.
This includes the use of juvenile adjudications to enhance a sentence within the statutory limits. See
supra note 10. Whatever the court means by this statement, California law allows for a jury to decide if
the accused actually suffered the prior conviction or juvenile adjudication at all. CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 1025; see People  v.  Bowden,  125  Cal.  Rptr.  2d  513,  517  (Ct.  App.  2002)  (“[T]he  defendant  has  a  statutory right to a jury trial, at least on the issue whether the defendant suffered the prior conviction”).
152 People v. Fowler, 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 874, 877 (Ct. App. 1999).
153 McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 547 (citing Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149–
50 n.14, 158 (1968)).
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The Use of Juvenile Adjudications as Strikes has a Positive Effect on
the Juvenile Justice System

The use of juvenile adjudications as strikes provides rehabilitation
through a deterrent effect and results in better representation of the juvenile’s  interests  through  more  aggressive  representation.    The  goal  of  the  juvenile justice system is rehabilitation, rather than punishment.154 The use
of juvenile adjudications as strikes does not frustrate that purpose; rather, it
promotes it. As discussed previously, enhancing the sentence of the current
offense because of a prior offense does not result in an increased punishment for the former offense, but only an increased punishment for the current offense.155 Therefore, using juvenile adjudications as strikes will not
result in a prospective increase in punishment for the juvenile adjudication.
The focus of the juvenile justice system will not shift to punishment. In
fact,  the  juvenile  justice  system’s  focus  on  rehabilitation  will  be  promoted  
through deterrence. When a juvenile is aware that his juvenile adjudication
could be used as a strike in a subsequent adult proceeding, the juvenile will
have a very good reason to avoid criminal activity in the future. This is a
goal of the Three Strikes Law—not just isolation of criminals from society,
but deterring people from committing violent felonies in the first place.156
Because the use of a juvenile adjudication as a strike provides a deterrent effect and an incentive to rehabilitate, it follows that adequate counsel
must be available to inform a juvenile of the ramifications of being found a
ward of the court. Juveniles have the right to counsel and the right to be
notified that they may have counsel appointed for them if they cannot afford counsel.157 However, there is a problem with under-representation of
juveniles in the juvenile justice system.158 This raises another argument
against using juvenile adjudications to enhance an adult sentence.159 However, while juvenile adjudications resulting without the aid of counsel or
valid waiver of that right cannot be used as strikes, the same cannot be said
for adjudications where the juvenile was adequately represented.

154 In re Charles C., 284 Cal. Rptr. 4, 5 (Ct. App. 1991) (“While  the  aim  of  adult  incarceration is
punishment, a juvenile commitment is geared toward treatment and rehabilitation with the state providing substitute parental care for wayward youths.”).
155 Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 243 (1998).
156 See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
157 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 41 (1967).
158 Less than fifty percent of juveniles appearing in juvenile court are represented by counsel.
Nicole M. Romine, A Compromised Solution: Balancing the Constitutional Consequences and the
Practical Benefits of Using Juvenile Adjudications for Sentence Enhancement Purposes, 45 WASHBURN
L.J. 113, 130 (2005); Richard E. Redding, Using Juvenile Adjudications for Sentence Enhancement
Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Is It Sound Policy?, 10 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 231, 247
(2002). Redding also discusses studies that show that juveniles are frequently unable to have effective
counsel because of the drain on public defender resources. Id. at 250.
159 Romine, supra note 158, at 131. The United States Supreme Court has held that it is unconstitutional to use a felony conviction obtained without the benefit of counsel or a valid waiver of that right
to enhance a subsequent conviction. Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 114–16 (1967).
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This discussion introduces another important impact of the use of juvenile adjudications as strikes on the juvenile justice system—more aggressive representation.160 Lawyers acting as counsel in the juvenile justice
system  tend  to  “act  more  as  a  guardian  ad  litem  than  a  zealous  advocate.”161
These attorneys may believe that it is in the best interest of the child to be
deemed a ward of the court and, because the adjudications seemingly have
little consequence after becoming an adult, that aggressive representation is
unnecessary.162 This   is   not   the   case   in   a   system,   such   as   California’s,  
where juvenile adjudications can have significant importance in adult criminal proceedings. Therefore, lawyers will be more likely to raise more objections, bring more pretrial motions, and appeal more frequently.163
Is this a bad thing? Some say it is, arguing that aggressive representation will result in clogged dockets and some guilty juveniles being acquitted.164 Some might argue that aggressive representation may also eventually turn the juvenile justice system into a shadow of its adult counterpart.
However, the benefits of aggressive representation far outweigh any possible negative consequences. The interests of the child will be represented
zealously and weighed against the interests of the state. Aggressive representation on behalf of the child will make it more likely that justice will be
done.
What would happen if the use of juvenile adjudications as strikes was
prohibited? Barring the use of juvenile adjudications as strikes would
swamp California courts with resentencing claims, resulting in a waste of
judicial resources.165 Barring the use of juvenile adjudications as strikes
would also result  in  “undeserved  lighter  sentences”  for  repeat  offenders.166
Recidivism is recidivism at whatever age. If the California Supreme Court
affirms Nguyen, the goals of the Three Strikes Law, approved by the
people, will be frustrated. Repeat offenders will receive lighter sentences
than they deserve, and juveniles will not be deterred from committing subsequent crimes.
CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK FOR THE FUTURE
Until the summer of 2007, California appellate courts were unanimous
in their approval of the use of prior juvenile adjudications as strikes. In
Nguyen, one of those courts held that prior juvenile adjudications cannot be
used as strikes because there is no right to a trial by jury in juvenile proceedings. The court argued that this did not come within the exception to
Apprendi’s general  rule:  “Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact
160
161
162
163
164
165
166

Marrus, supra note 127, at 1354.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1354–55.
Id. at 1355.
Id. at 1348.
Id.
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that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable
doubt.”167 The decision has been appealed, and the California Supreme
Court has granted review.168
The California Supreme Court should reverse the Nguyen decision and
restore uniformity and predictability to the juvenile and criminal justice
systems. Prior juvenile adjudications have sufficient procedural protections
to reliably indicate recidivism, a traditional sentencing factor. Furthermore, using prior juvenile adjudications as strikes promotes the rehabilitative purpose of the juvenile justice system and the purpose of the Three
Strikes Law to keep society safe.
This   issue’s   importance   extends   beyond   California’s borders. In
Nguyen, the court repeatedly indicates that it sees a rising tide of courts and
commentators combining to argue against the use of juvenile adjudications
to extend a sentence in an adult proceeding beyond statutory limits. Because   California’s   Three   Strikes   Law   is   a   well-known statute that allows
for sentence enhancement beyond the statutory maximum, the ruling of the
California Supreme Court in Nguyen impact this issue nationwide.

167
168

Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) (emphasis added).
People v. Nguyen, 62 Cal. Rptr. 3d 255, review granted, 169 P.3d 882 (Cal. 2007).

